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I. INTRODUCTION
A discount rate indicates how to compare future costs and bene-
fits to current costs and benefits. Insofar as the discount rate is high,
we are counting future costs and benefits for less. A zero discount rate,
by definition, means that the future counts for as much as the present.
My informal polling over the years suggests that many advocates
of greater state spending -especially noneconomists -like the idea of
a very low discount rate. Many of these individuals wish that our gov-
ernment would devote more resources to education, to infrastructure,
and to improving the environment. They see a lower discount rate as
supporting these policies. More generally, these individuals believe we
are not caring enough about the future. Very low rates of discount
therefore serve as a "left-wing" view in most cases. Similarly, support
for market-based discount rates often comes from centrist or more
"right-wing" views.'
In contrast, I see a stronger concern for the distant future as cut-
ting across the current political spectrum. A greater orientation to-
ward the future is likely to increase the desirability of policies favoring
a market economy, economic growth, and technological innovation-
all prerequisites for sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, some
of the arguments for these choices may require a deep concern for the
more distant future. For instance, strongly positive discount rates usu-
ally imply that we should grant considerable importance to the alle-
viation of immediate suffering. Market liberalizations, whatever long-
run virtues they may have, sometimes increase immediate suffering.
Market economies and market reforms look better the greater the
weight we place on the relatively distant future. A free society is better
today than a corrupt and totalitarian alternative. But one hundred
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1 For a "left-wing" view of discounting, see, for example, Robert Solow, The Economics of
Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 Am Econ Rev 1, 10 (1974) (imposing the require-
ment that consumption per head be equalized over time so no generation is favored over an-
other). But see Wilfred Beckerman, Through Green-Colored Glasses: Environmentalism Recon-
sidered at 192-94 (Cato Institute 1996) (offering a market-oriented view that is critical of zero
discounting).
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years from now, the difference in human welfare, and other relevant
pluralist values, will prove far more pronounced.
With these issues in mind, let us turn to the discount rate and its
implications.
II. ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO DISCOUNTING
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Economists, when they ponder discounting, commonly offer at
least one of three points. First, many believe that the problem largely
takes care of itself. Altruism leads many people to care for their chil-
dren, their grandchildren, and their great-grandchildren. Arguably,
overlapping generations extend the circle of care yet further into the
future. Markets in durable assets help us trade in these assets. A
profit-maximizing landowner maintains his stock of trees rather than
cutting it down, even if he does not care about future generations.
But these automatic mechanisms-however weak or strong they
may be-do not apply to all settings. Even if we take those arguments
at face value, we do not see comparable property rights-induced altru-
ism in public policy decisions. When people are voting or choosing for
all future generations as a whole, they often behave quite selfishly.
Political time horizons tend to be low, often extending no further than
the next election or the next media cycle. Many government policies,
such as Medicare, redistribute to the wealthy elderly at the expense of
future growth. Therefore, my core scenario is a potentially short-sighted
political procedure, not a father with children or a landowner trying to
conserve the value of his trees.
The economists' second response is to argue that we should dis-
count for risk, and that risk may be correlated with temporal distance.
A current benefit is certain, but a future benefit may or may not mate-
rialize. To be sure, we should take account of risk, but we need not add
an additional discount factor for time. Time and risk are correlated
imperfectly, especially for the more distant future. Beyond a specified
forecasting horizon, risk may not increase much, but the time clock
keeps ticking. More generally, discounting for risk supports rather
than overturns the idea of caring about the distant future. It is pre-
cisely because we care about future tragedies that we seek to make
the world less risky.'
2 We should not discount the welfare of our successors because those individuals will be
better off or wealthier. Even if we take the egalitarian premise for granted, wealth per se does not
supply a good reason to discount future welfare. If the rich enjoy additional wealth less, a very low
rate of discount will not prevent us from reflecting this judgment by other means such as explicit
distributional weights. Even if the future is wealthier on average, we can discount for wealth
without using a separate discount rate for time.
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The economists' third response thinks of discounting in terms of
opportunity cost, as represented by a market rate of interest. 'I'ypically
the project under evaluation is akin to a dam or a new bus line, where
the relevant costs and benefits are measured in dollar terms. A dollar
today can be invested to yield more than a dollar a year from now.
More generally, capital is productive, and modern economies typically
grow wealthier over time. So a dollar today is worth more, at the mar-
gin, than a dollar in the future. This judgment does not require inter-
personal comparisons of utility. The positive market interest rate
equalizes marginal rates of substitution over time; in other words, the
positive interest rate expresses the lesser market value of a future dol-
lar relative to a current dollar. This argument does not require positive
time preference in the traditional sense.
The economic argument need not accept observed market inter-
est rates uncritically. We must adjust for risk, transactions costs, and
other complicating factors such as taxes. But observed real rates of
return give us some proxy for the greater value of current resources.
Since market interest rates are typically positive in real terms, I will
use the phrase "strong positive discounting" to describe this view.
Consider the following equation as representing the economic
argument for discounting:'
Cl(c= ( )+ I(Q1C
C
The first term represents pure time preference, whereas the second
term represents the greater marginal utility of consumption in a speci-
fied period.
My revision of this equation is simple. The first term fails to apply
to the long run if we refuse to apply positive time preference across
3 See K.J. Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in
James P Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and Erik F. Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social
Dimensions of Climate Change 125,130 (Cambridge 1996) (noting that damages of $1 billion two
hundred years from now has a present value of only $1300); John Broome, Weighing Goods:
Equality, Uncertainty and Time 60-63 (Cambridge 1991) (providing an example of how risking
money on day one can result in more money in the future); Robert C. Lind, et al, Discounting for
Time and Risk in Energy Policy 25-26 (Resources for the Future 1982).
4 The economic argument does not require time preference, but it does require assump-
tions about the intertemporal substitutability of consumption. Diminishing marginal utility, in
the classic sense, is defined at a single point in time. But how do differing marginal utilities of
consumption vary across time? How does my two millionth dollar next year compare to my one
millionth dollar today? This variable is distinct from either classic time preference or classic
diminishing marginal utility. For the argument to work, we must assume that consumption to-
morrow is a relatively close substitute for consumption today.
5 See Partha S. Dasgupta and Geoffrey M. Heal, Economic Theory and Exhaustible Re-
sources 294 (Cambridge 1979).
6 Id.
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generations. The second term will be replaced by broad and rough
interpersonal comparisons of utility. When we consider the more fun-
damental question of how to discount cardinal well-being, opportunity
costs will not apply in that setting.' We cannot invest utility for a posi-
tive return as we invest dollars or real resources, so we must seek other
methods of comparing utilities across time. I will return to how ordinal
and interpersonal cardinal approaches to discounting fit together. But
plausibly, we care more about well-being than we do about wealth per
se; this makes interpersonal cardinalism primary when we have a
choice between the two approaches.
A. Time Preference
Consider a decisionmaker weighting present and future interests.
The following table represents some potential tradeoffs, using various
positive rates of intergenerational discount:
TABLE 1: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF FUTURE BENEFITS EQUAL TO
ONE PRESENT BENEFIT BASED ON DIFFERENT DISCOUNT RATES
Years in Discount Rates
the Future 1% 3% 5% 10%
30 1.3 2.4 4.3 17.4
50 1.6 4.3 11.4 117.3
100 2.7 19.2 131.5 13,780.6
500 144.7 2,621,877.2 39,323,261,827 4.96 x 1020
A simple example shows what is at stake. If we discount the fu-
ture by 5 percent, a given outcome 500 years from now is worth more
than 39 billion times less than that same outcome would be worth to-
day. Alternatively, at that same discount rate, 1 death 200 years from
now is equal in value to 131.5 deaths, of comparable lives, 300 years
from now. Few people would share these conclusions.
Given these comparisons, the arguments against discounting well-
being are straightforward. Derek Parfit and Tyler Cowen wrote the
following:
Why should costs and benefits receive less weight, simply be-
cause they are further in the future? When the future comes,
these benefits and costs will be no less real. Imagine finding out
that you, having just reached your twenty-first birthday, must
7 By cardinal well-being 1 mean simply the view that utility is a real entity, to some (im-
perfect) extent comparable across persons and across time, and more than just the economists'
ex post mapping of observed choices onto a function.
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soon die of cancer because one evening Cleopatra wanted an ex-
tra helping of dessert. How could this be justified?'
Under a positive discount rate, no matter how low, one life today can
be worth more than one million lives in the future, or worth the entire
subsequent survival of the human race, if we use a long enough time
horizon. At the very least, we should be skeptical that positive dis-
count rates apply to every comparison.
Consider a policy that kills a person today, or a policy that kills a
person fifty years from now. And by assumption, each death, when it
comes, will strike a person with an equal remaining life expectancy.
The traditional economic approach suggests that the life today is
worth more by some discounted amount. But a focus on the discount-
ing of well-being will imply a different policy conclusion. Most likely
the future life will be happier than the current life. We can lose one
life today or a (possibly happier) life in the more distant future. This
comparison should either be a wash, or arguably we should favor the
future life, again assuming we have discounted for risk.
Time preference does not justify the positive discounting of well-
being across the generations. Time preference may mean that an indi-
vidual prefers to have a given benefit sooner rather than later. Per-
haps I am impatient to enjoy my steak dinner, or I wish to put off go-
ing to the dentist. It is a moot point whether individual time prefer-
ence for utility is rational, but pure time preference across the genera-
tions is harder to defend. Our still unborn great-great-grandchildren
will not receive benefits for some while. But in the meantime they are
not sitting around, waiting impatiently. It cannot be argued that a
forthcoming slice of time is worth less because future generations
must wait for it. Nor did medieval peasants receive some kind of bene-
fit from having been born before us.
The concept of time preference, which relates to individual
choice, cannot be applied directly to unborn people. Time preference
8 Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Peter Laslett and
James S. Fishkin, eds, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations 144,145 (Yale 1992).
9 The economics of restitution consider the issue from the temporal reverse. When determin-
ing the size of an intergenerational award, it is not always plausible to use straightforward com-
pounding according to market interest rates. Assume, for instance, that A stole $1,000 from B back
in 1850. If we apply a 7 percent rate of compounding to this loss, this will be worth roughly $35
million in the year 2005. Yet few observers hold the intuition that the descendants of A should pay
that sum to the descendants of B, circa 2005. And when large sums are at stake, we doubt whether
simple compounding makes these present values commensurable over time. Had the theft not
occurred, the "victimized" descendants would not, in all likelihood, be current multimillionaires. See
generally Tyler Cowen, Discounting and Restitution, 26 Phil & Pub Aff 168 (1997).
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therefore does not justify the discounting of the distant future even if
it justifies Tom wanting a steak dinner sooner rather than later."
Looking to physics, Einstein's theory of relativity suggests that
there is no fact of the matter as to when "now" is. Any measurement
of time is relative to the perspective of an observer. In other words, if
you are traveling very fast, the clocks of others are speeding up from
your point of view. You will spend a few years in a spaceship but when
you return to earth thousands or millions of years will have passed.
Yet it seems odd, to say the least, to discount the well-being of people
as their velocity increases. Should we pay less attention to the safety of
our spacecraft, and thus the welfare of our astronauts, the faster those
vehicles go? If, for instance, we sent off a spacecraft at near the veloc-
ity of light, the astronauts would return to earth, hardly aged, millions
of years hence. Should we-because of positive discounting-not give
them enough fuel to make a safe landing? And if you decline to con-
demn them to death, how are they different from other "residents" in
the distant future?
Instead of letting our speedy astronauts die, we can think of the
universe as a block of four-dimensional space-time. We would not dis-
count human well-being for temporal distance per se any more than
we would discount well-being for spatial location per se. Even if Ein-
stein turns out to have been wrong, it would be odd if the case for
positive discounting required his refutation.
An imperfect markets argument also suggests that observed mar-
ket rates of interest are too high for many normative social purposes.
Welfare economics holds up perfect markets as an ideal, yet future
generations cannot contract in today's markets. If we can imagine fu-
ture generations engaging in such contracting, current decisions would
run more in their favor than is otherwise the case.
Consider a much wealthier future one hundred years from now.
Some of these individuals might die from current environmental deci-
sions. If those individuals could bid on today's policies, they would bid
for greater concern for the future. It is an open question how wealthy
a group of bidders they would be; in present value terms this will de-
pend on the relationship between the growth rate of the economy and
10 Individual time preference is a tricky concept. What if I am very hungry and wish to eat
now rather than later? Does this count as time preference? Or does time preference imply that
the same "eating experience," holding the level of hunger constant, should be preferred sooner
rather than later. If we hold everything constant, in what sense can we say that time passes? The
passage of time must mean that ceteris paribus clauses cannot be totally strict, but then we re-
turn to the question of what is to vary. Arguably all instances of "goods in different time periods"
are simply different goods, noting that economists define "goods" in terms of revealed preference
and indifference in the first place.
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the rate of interest. If we think of the growth of wealth as (roughly)
matching the interest or discount rate, their bids, in today's terms,
would carry about as much weight as ours. And if the policy had a po-
tentially big impact on their lives, future generations could well be the
dominant (hypothetical) bidders in our policy evaluation.
John Broome offers a related thought experiment, in which fu-
ture generations participate in current markets." We can imagine a
trust fund set up in their name, which could borrow against their fu-
ture earnings and bid for or against current policies. In the final equi-
librium, future generations will have redistributed some resources to
themselves by obtaining a better political deal.
This thought experiment is more complex than first meets the
eye. For instance, when allowing future generations to bid in these
imaginary markets, what level of wealth do we assign them? Presuma-
bly, we let them bid with the present discounted value of their wealth,
but what rate of discount do we use to measure this magnitude? We
are looking to determine a correct discount rate, and thus cannot start
by assuming a particular rate already in place. While we might try to
solve for mixes of bids and discount rates which imply equilibria, that
procedure will not in general offer unique solutions.'2
Regardless of how we answer this question, arguably future gen-
erations should have more bidding power in this thought experiment
than they have in the real world, namely zero. The relevant first-best
optimum then involves greater resources for future generations, at the
expense of current generations, than does the status quo. Given this
description, we arguably should prefer any one-to-one resource trans-
fer from the present into the future. Such a reallocation would bring
us closer to the specified optimum. This suggests a possibly negative
rate of social discount for small choices at current margins, to reflect
the desirability of making one-to-one resource shifts into the future. I
am not endorsing the idea of a negative rate overall, especially given
the difficulties of constructing a coherent version of this thought ex-
periment. But the opportunity cost argument, once we take perfect
markets into account, does not automatically imply strongly positive
rates of discount for intergenerational allocations, even for real re-
sources rather than utility. Observed intertemporal prices are based
11 John Broome, Discounting the Future, 23 Phil & Pub Aft 128,151-52 (1994).
12 Imagine, for instance, two equilibria. In one, the intergenerational discount rate is very
high, and the future generation has no real wealth to bid with. In another, the rate is very low-
possibly negative-and future generations have immense amounts of wealth to bid with. Each
distributional decision will support an equilibrium, yet we are left with no guidance as to the
appropriate discount rate.
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on highly imperfect market participation, at least if current policies
can affect the more distant future.
B. Gamma Discounting
Models with changing discount factors over time will tend to have
relatively low discount rates on net." The lowest discount rate will
have the highest contribution to an expected value calculation and
thus should carry an especially high weight in our decisions. This can
lead to what is sometimes called "gamma discounting."
Richard Posner summarizes the argument:
Suppose there's an equal chance that the applicable interest rate
throughout this and future centuries will be either 1 percent or 5
percent. The present value of $1 in 100 years is 36.9 cents if the
interest rate used to compute the present value is 1 percent but
only .76 cents (a shade over three-quarters of a cent) if it is 5 per-
cent. Now consider the 101st year and remember the assumption
that the two alternative discount rates are equally probable. If
the interest rate used to discount the future to the present value
is 1 percent,"then the present value of $1 at the end of that year
will have shrunk from 36.9 cents to 36.6 cents. If instead the in-
terest rafe used is 5 percent, the present value of .76 cents will
have shrunk to about .75 cents. This means that the average pre-
sent value of $1 at the end of the 101st year will be 18.68 cents,
implying an average discount rate of less than 2 percent, rather
than 3 percent. The reason is that the more rapid decline in value
under the higher discount rate (5 percent) reduces its influence
on present value.'"
In other words, when there is uncertainty about future discount rates,
lower rates have a greater weight the further we look into the future.
Standard approaches, properly applied, imply lower discount rates
than are often believed.
Differing opinions about discount rates produce results compa-
rable to uncertainty about future discount rates. Martin Weitzman
notes: "[E]ven if every individual believes in a constant discount rate,
13 See Martin L. Weitzman, Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at Its Lowest
Possible Rate, 36 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 201, 207 (1998) (stating that long-term calculations will
have a low interest rate because the discount rate shrinks over time).
14 Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 153-54 (Oxford 2004), citing Rich-
ard Newell and William Pizer, Discounting the Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation: How Much
Do Uncertain Rates Increase Valuations? 15-16 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2001),
online at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/econ%5Fdiscounting%2Epdf (visited Jan 22,
2007).
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the wide spread of opinion on what it should be makes the effective
social discount rate decline significantly over time."15 Differing opin-
ions imply some uncertainty as to who is correct, and the above logic
kicks in. The lower discount rate estimates will receive greater weight
in the expected value calculation.
The results from gamma discounting often show up in the intui-
tions of economists and others. Many individuals will argue that the
present is more important than thirty years from now, but that after
some point further differences in time should cease to matter. For in-
stance, perhaps what happens three hundred years from now is not
much less important than what happens two hundred years from now.
This view has found significant support in polls of economists."
The behavioral literature on time preference suggests that most
of our tendency to discount is bunched in the very near future. For
instance, an individual will greatly prefer a dollar today to a dollar
three weeks from now. The implicit discount rates on such choices can
run as high as 300 percent. But when the comparison is between ten
years from now and twenty years from now, the rate of discount is
very low, sometimes zero. Individual time preference most frequently
concerns very near events.
Gamma discounting nonetheless fails for very long-run compari-
sons. Gamma discounting still implies that we can choose a single cor-
rect (nonzero) number or set of numbers for the long-term rate of
discount. If such rates are positive, we still face the possibility that a
single life today will be worth more than continued world survival,
provided we choose a long enough time horizon for the comparison.
For most practical issues, these problems are unlikely to arise. None-
theless, gamma discounting can place too much weight on the present
when we look at long periods of time.
III. DEEP CONCERN FOR THE DISTANT FUTURE
In lieu of gamma discounting, I suggest a postulate of Deep Con-
cern for the Distant Future. In this view, we should not count catastro-
phic losses for much less, simply because those losses come in the fu-
15 Martin L. Weitzman, Gamma Discounting, 91 Am Econ Rev 260,260 (1991).
16 See id at 269-70 (polling fifty economists).
17 See, for example, Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O'Donoghue, Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, in George Loewenstein, Daniel Read, and
Roy F Baumeister, eds, Time and Decision: Economic and Psychological Perspectives on In-
tertemporal Choice 13, 25 (Russell Sage 2002) (finding a 345 percent annual discount rate over a
one-month horizon).
18 See Tyler Cowen, Consequentialism Implies a Zero Rate of Intergenerational Discount, in
Laslett and Fishkin, eds, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations 162, 162-65 (cited in note
8) (attempting to axiomatize zero discounting).
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ture. In the absence of qualifying factors, no amount of temporal dis-
tance per se should cause widespread tragedies to dwindle into cur-
rent insignificance. For instance, we should believe that the end of the
world is a truly terrible event, even if that collapse comes in the very
distant future. Similarly, the continued persistence of civilization, three
hundred years from now, is much better than no further civilization at
that point in time. Our algorithms for evaluating the future should not
yield contrary conclusions.
This informal postulate does not translate easily into formal analy-
sis. First, well-being is a rough and heterogeneous concept not suscepti-
ble to exact measurement, even in principle. There appear to be many
different kinds of happiness and more than one reward system in the
human brain. We cannot apply exact axioms to very inexact concepts
with much precision.
Second, the choice across an infinite or finite time horizon often
raises embarrassing questions. Infinite horizons can involve problems
with infinities, boundedness, and nonmonotonicity. 9 Finite horizons
postulate an immediate truncation at some arbitrarily chosen date;
this is counterintuitive and contrary to our concern for the distant fu-
ture. Again, given the imprecision of the well-being concept, we
should not expect an exact and axiomatic approach to the time hori-
zon to fit the problem perfectly.
Those caveats having been noted, the mathematical options fall
into a few categories. The most straightforward approach invokes the
polar approach of a zero discount rate for utility:
SW = Y U(a'). (2)
Such a practice would represent a basic principle of neutrality or
equal respect across time. No person would count for less simply be-
cause his or her well-being lies in the more distant future. In this view,
time per se does not possess ethical significance. A death in fifty years
counts for as much as a death today, holding other conditions equal.
This draws upon the argument above that there should be no positive
time preference across different lives in different generations. Of
course, we still might use positive discounting within lives but zero
discounting across lives and generations.'
19 See Nick Bostrom, Infinite Ethics 7 (unpublished manuscript 2005), online at http://
www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf (visited Jan 22, 2007) ("Infinitudes are notoriously
counterintuitive to the human mind.").
20 See Colin Price, Time, Discounting and Value 327,345 (Blackwell 1993) (arguing against
positive discounting for future generations).
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Alternatively, we could borrow a version of the Golden Rule
from capital theory:
Max: lim U (a')- (3)
This equation instructs us to choose the highest sustainable path of
utility or consumption over time. That is, we should maximize a steady
state value over an indefinite time horizon; we can think of this value
as utility or well-being. This gives us some general guidance as to a
good macrosolution, without requiring that each and every compari-
son be subject to a zero discount rate for utility.2
An overtaking criterion presents a third approach. In this view,
we should be willing to give up a discrete benefit today if in return we
can create a sufficiently long string of well-being increases for the fu-
ture. More formally, we can write the following:
The Overtaking Criterion: A sequence h' = (a', a2 ,... ) is pre-
ferred to h' = (a', a2 ,... ) if
t t
3To  E N: V T > T, W , (a ') > W , (d,) (4)
t=1 t=1
This equation prefers one sequence of values to another if that former
sequence, after some point in time and continuing for the future, re-
mains systematically higher.
Unlike much of the formal literature, we need not embed the
overtaking criterion in an infinite time horizon. Instead, we can prefer
the dominating sequence if that subsequent domination lasts "long
enough." If we only have one final time period where one sequence
beats another, this may not seem to justify a normative conclusion.
But if one sequence dominates another for, say, fifty or two hundred
years running, with no immediate end in sight, the case for that domi-
nating sequence is stronger.
21 For early presentations of the Golden Rule, see, for example, EP Ramsey, A Mathemati-
cal Theory of Saving, 38 Econ J 543, 543 (1928) (articulating the rule as follows: "[t]he rate of
saving multiplied by the marginal utility of money should always be equal to the amount by
which the total net rate of enjoyment of utility falls short of the maximum possible rate of en-
joyment"); Edmund Phelps, The Golden Rule of Accumulation: A Fable for Growthmen, 51 Am
Econ Rev 638, 642 (1961) (stating that the Golden Rule is met when "the investment ratio and
the profit ratio are constant and equal"); J.E. Meade, The Effect of Savings on Consumption in a
State of Steady Growth, 29 Rev Econ Stud 227, 230 (1962) (rejecting profits greater than invest-
ment as the universal rule for the optimum level of savings). For the conditions under which
various principles coincide, see Geoffrey Heal, Valuing the Future: Economic Theory and Sus-
tainability 110-11 (Columbia 1998).
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We also can introduce add-ons to an overtaking criterion. For in-
stance, we might stipulate that an overtaking which starts earlier is to
be preferred to an overtaking which starts later. We might addend a
Pareto principle: in some cases, two finite sequences have equivalent
latter parts, but one sequence strictly dominates the other during the
earlier dates. These secondary standards are common sense and would
be found in most plausible ethical theories. Such modifications avoid
the potential problem of a "dictatorship of the future," common to
many infinite horizon models. In such a setting an overtaking criterion
might lead to the present counting for nothing. A boost in current val-
ues in a sequence, taken alone, will not affect the overtaking calcula-
tions for the later periods of the sequence. But these added criteria-
or other parts of a broader pluralist moral theory-will help us evalu-
ate future-neutral choices."
Drawing upon these principles, I will consider a rough-and-ready
rule of policy evaluation, based on the idea that sufficiently large
quantities of wealth make people better off.
A. The Principle of Growth.
We should make political choices so as to maximize the rate of sus-
tainable economic growth.
We also can attach rights constraints to this recommendation.
22 For discussions of the points raised in this paragraph, see Graciela Chichilnisky, What is
Sustainable Development?, 73 Land Econ 467, 468, 477 (1997) (suggesting a modified version of
the overtaking criterion that does not force the present time period to count for nothing). We
could entertain such an alternative if, in fact, we faced an infinite time horizon and a dictatorship
problem. See Posner, Catastrophe at 152-53 (cited in note 14). See also Peter A. Diamond, The
Evaluation of Infinite Utility Streams, 33 Econometrica 170, 170-77 (1965); Tjalling C. Koopmans,
Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience, 28 Econometrica 287, 287,296 (1960). With an infinite
horizon, the overtaking criterion will fail to satisfy certain axioms of intergenerational equity,
such as anonymity or indifference across labeling decisions. On the difficulties of satisfying all
reasonable axioms in an infinite horizon setting, see Marc Fleurbaey and Philippe Michel, In-
tertemporal Equity and the Extension of the Ramsey Criterion, 39 J Math Econ 777, 777, 784-86
(2003); Toyotaka Sakai, Intergenerational Preferences and Sensitivity to the Present, 4 Econ Bull 1,
4-5 (2003). But see Geir B. Asheim, Wolfgang Buchholz, and Bertil Tungodden, Justifying Sus-
tainability, 41 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 252, 253 (2001). On the postulates of "stationarity" and
"independence," see Koopmans, 28 Econometrica at 293-95, 307-08. Note that the difficulties
with infinity are not unique to issues of intertemporal value. Many plausible cosmologies allow
for infinite expected value throughout the universe, with or without a zero discount rate. See, for
example, Bostrom, Infinite Ethics at 16 (cited in note 19). These cosmologies may not be true,
but they need only have some positive chance of being true for the infinity to surface in our
expected value calculations. Pascal's Wager and the St. Petersburg Paradox bring related
issues to the fore, again without relying on a zero discount rate. See generally Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/ (visited Jan 22,
2007) and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-stpetersburg/ (visited Jan 22,2007).
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1. The modified principle of growth.
We should push for sustainable economic growth, but not at the
expense of inviolable human rights.
For simplicity, I will refer to the Principle of Growth, but it should
be understood that the option on rights constraints remains. With or
without the rights constraint, the Principle should be understood as a
useful practical rule, rather than as a first principle of moral theory
which can withstand all possible philosophic counterexamples. It is a
first-order approximation and a decision guide, rather than a con-
tender for the Best Ethical Theory.
Maximizing the long-run rate of growth refers to gross domestic
product (GDP) as properly understood, and not as currently meas-
ured by governments. True GDP should account for leisure time,
household production, and environmental amenities. Current GDP
statistics have a bias towards what can be measured, rather than what
contributes to human welfare. For this reason, "maximizing the rate of
growth" does not mean that everyone should work the maximum
number of hours in a day. An eighteen-hour workday might maximize
measured GDP but would not maximize true GDP over time, once we
take the value of leisure into account, not to mention labor burnout.
Furthermore, we wish to maintain higher growth over time, and
not just for a single year. Maximizing the sustainable rate of economic
growth does not imply pursuing immediate growth at the expense of
all other values. Policies that seek growth at breakneck speed are fre-
quently unstable in both economic and political terms. The Shah of
Iran, for instance, tried to bring his country into the modern world
very rapidly. Growth rates were high for a while but in the longer run
could not be maintained. Since the revolution, Iran has done poorly,
often with negative rates of growth. The Shah's forced modernization
did not in fact maximize economic growth, and a more cautious set of
policies likely would have been better.3
It might be argued that a well-being approach to discounting is
unlikely to prove operational. We are far from being able to measure
human well-being. But we need only very gross welfare judgments. We
need establish only that much richer people are better off than much
poorer people. If we accept this intuition, the moral force behind the
Principle of Growth is simple. Greater sustainable growth will, at
some point in the future, make many people much better off than
would otherwise be the case. These benefits can continue and indeed
23 For a formal look at the concept of sustainability, see Heal, Valuing the Future at 1-25
(cited in note 21).
2007]
The University of Chicago Law Review
extend themselves across long periods of time. We should act to bring
about these benefits, rather than declining them.
2. Why growth is a compelling metric for welfare.
Economic growth alleviates human misery and lengthens human
lives. Wealthier societies have better living standards, better medicines,
and offer greater autonomy, greater fulfillment, and more sources of
fun.4 As recently as the end of the nineteenth century, life expectancy
in Western Europe ran about forty years of age. Polio, tuberculosis,
and typhoid were common ailments, even among the rich. Most indi-
viduals worked at hard physical labor, and a college or university edu-
cation was a luxury.5
Just as the present appears remarkable from the vantage point of
the past, our future may offer comparable advances in benefits. Contin-
ued progress might bring greater life expectancies, cures for debilitating
diseases, and cognitive enhancements. Millions or billions of people
could have much better and longer lives. Many features of modem life
might someday seem as backward as we now regard the large number
of women who died in childbirth for lack of proper care. Most of all,
economic growth limits and mitigates tragedies. It is a simple failure of
imagination to believe that human progress has run its course.
Imagine a time traveler from the eighteenth century visiting the
life of Bill Gates. He would witness television, automobiles, refrigera-
tors, central heating, antibiotics, plentiful food, flush toilets, cell
phones, personal computers, and affordable air travel, among other
remarkable benefits. The most impressive features of Gates's life, from
a historical point of view, are those shared by most middle-class
Americans today. The very existence of an advanced civilization-the
product of cumulative economic growth-confers immense benefits
on ordinary citizens.26
Even today's poor, in the United States, enjoy a virtually unimag-
inable standard of living by comparison to previous times. In 1995, 41
percent of poor households owned their own homes. The average poor
home had three bedrooms, one-and-a-half baths, a garage, and a porch
or patio. Now 70 percent of poor households own a car; 27 percent
own two or more cars. In terms of leisure products, 97 percent of the
poor have a color television, and almost half of the poor have two or
24 On the benefits of a wealthier society, see Indur M. Goklany, Affluence, Technology, and
Well-Being, 53 Case W Res L Rev 369,378-82 (2002).
25 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of life expectancy and living conditions, see
generally James C. Riley, Rising Life Expectancy:A Global History (Cambridge 2001).
26 I am indebted to Don Boudreaux for this way of framing the point.
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more color televisions. As for household appliances that have only
appeared in the last half-century, 64 percent of poor households own
microwave ovens, half have a stereo system, and over a quarter have
an automatic dishwasher. Two-thirds of households classified as poor
have air conditioning. For purposes of comparison, only 36 percent of
the entire U.S. population had air conditioning as recently as the early
1970s. Today's American poor are more likely to be overweight than
are middle-class persons. Most poor children today grow up to be, on
average, one inch taller and ten pounds heavier than World War II
American GIs."
Wealth and well-being move together in the long run. The mod-
em world is much richer than medieval times, and it is much better off.
Look back at how we climbed out of the poverty of the year 1000 CE
or 5000 BCE. Analogous reasoning applies today. If we are sufficiently
forward-looking, sustainable economic growth will be our priority.
World history offers precedents for the idea of a "great transfor-
mation," leading to enormous increases in the quality and quantity of
human lives. Our ancestors did not foresee the evolution of humans, the
agricultural revolution, the "urban revolution" (Sumeria and Mesopo-
tamia, circa 4000 BCE), or the Industrial Revolution. Each develop-
ment, over time, drastically changed the human condition, eventually
very much for the better. The history of economic growth, to some ex-
tent, is the history of working out the consequences of such unforeseen
transformations.2' It is unlikely that we have seen the last of such revolu-
tions, at least provided that civilization manages to stay afloat.
The importance of the growth rate increases the further into the
future we look. If a country grows at 2 percent, as opposed to growing
at 1 percent, the difference in welfare in a single year is relatively
small. But over time the difference becomes very large. For instance,
had America grown 1 percentage point less per year between 1870
and 1990, the America of 1990 would be no richer than the Mexico of
1990.9 At a growth rate of 5 percent per annum, it takes just over 80
years for a country to move from a per capita income of $500 to a per
capita income of $25,000, defining both in terms of constant real dollars.
At a growth rate of 1 percent, such an improvement takes 393 years.
Robert Lucas put it succinctly: "The consequences for human
welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once
27 See Robert Rector, America Has the World's Richest Poor People, Wall St J I (Sept 24,
1998) (summarizing U.S. Census statistics of those classified as living in poverty).
28 See Robin Hanson, Long-Term Growth As A Sequence of Exponential Modes, J Econ
Behav & Org (forthcoming), online at http://hanson.gmu.edu/longgrow.pdf (visited Jan 22,2007)
("We thus... model[] long term human history as a sequence of exponential growth modes.").
29 See Tyler Cowen, Does the Welfare State Help the Poor?, 19 Soc Phil & Policy 36,45 (2002).
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one starts to think about [exponential growth], it is hard to think
about anything else."'
Even a very small growth increment becomes enormous after
enough time has passed. If we find 7 percent growth a compelling rea-
son to disregard some non-growth-correlated value, we will find a
smaller boost in the growth rate a compelling reason as well, but only
if our time horizon is sufficiently long.
If you are comparing a 1 percentage point boost to the growth rate,
and starting at real income parity, you need a time horizon of 110.4
years to establish a 3:1 ratio of superiority. If you are comparing a 2 per-
centage point boost in the growth rate you need a time horizon of 55.5
years. For a more ambitious boost of 5 percentage points, the time hori-
zon must stretch for only 22.5 years. The force of the Principle of
Growth does not require time horizons of millions or billions of years.
Keep in mind that the indicated number of years expresses when
a 3:1 ratio will be reached. Over time, if the higher growth continues,
the 3:1 ratio will be exceeded on an ongoing basis. For growth boosts
of 1, 2, and 5 percentage points net, we would need 161, 81, and 33
years respectively to reach a quintupling of real income. So the 3:1
requirement is only a temporary milestone on the path toward even
greater discrepancies of wealth and (likely) welfare. Asking a policy to
deliver a 3:1 wealth ratio is thus a fairly stringent rule for ascertaining
the welfare-dominance of one outcome over another.
Although I am focusing on utilitarian values, the benefits of
growth are not restricted to utility. For instance, wealthier societies
bring greater access to the arts and better education.31 Economic
growth also minimizes the "tyranny of place." Individuals suffer a lack
of freedom when they have little or no chance to escape the circum-
stances of their births. Perhaps they are born poor, into the wrong so-
cial class, into a community with little tradition of formal education, or
far removed from urban culture. Today, because of wealth, more indi-
viduals escape these shackles than ever before. We are more mobile,
more able to shape our selves, more able to choose our friends, and
more able to weave together different cultural traditions when con-
structing our personal narratives.
30 Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J Monetary Econ
3,5 (1988).
31 See Tyler Cowen, In Praise of Commercial Culture 16 (Harvard 1998) ("The artistic
professions ... flourish with economic growth."). See also Alexander Tabarrok and Tyler Cowen,
Who Benefits From Progress?, 51 Kyklos 379, 388 (1998) (asserting that wealthier individuals
have higher elasticities of substitution allowing for increased education in the form of an ex-
panded consumption set).
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These pluralistic considerations all point toward the same conclu-
sion. The more rapidly growing economy will, at some point, bring
much higher levels of human well-being on an ongoing basis. We will
favor growth even if we focus only on special egalitarian concerns
about the very poor. The economic growth of the wealthier countries
benefits the very poor as well. Most generally, the evidence suggests
that the bottom quintile of an economy shares proportionally in
growth. " Furthermore, a growing wealthy economy has a greater ca-
pacity to absorb immigrants. Poor people who migrate to rich coun-
tries earn much higher incomes, and their children become richer still.
A typical migrant from rural Mexico to the United States will move
from earning $2 a day to $10 an hour. Over time, the children of im-
migrants approach the national average, depending on how long they
have been in the country and how concerned they are with assimilat-
ing. Of course, the richer the wealthier country, the more new immi-
grants will benefit.
Immigrants also send remittances back home. Total remittances
around the world are now about $80 billion a year, about twice the
amount of the formal category of foreign aid. Remittances, however,
bypass governments and do not encounter comparable problems with
waste or corruption. Remittances are now ten times the amount of net
private capital flows, after adjusting for profit repatriation and interest
payments. To cite one example, Mexicans working in the United States
send back home $20 billion every year, circa 2003. This sum is twice
the value of Mexico's agricultural exports, and over a third more than
tourist revenue. Many Latin Americans have used U.S. remittances to
start new businesses or revitalize their communities through infra-
structure investments.33
Many migrants return to their home countries, bringing skills and
liberal democratic ideas. Software repatriates have helped build In-
dia's competitiveness in high-tech industries. Thousands of Asian stu-
dents have obtained science or engineering degrees from American
universities, thereafter returning home to start new businesses. If a
country is willing to offer some scope for entrepreneurship, it need not
fear a "brain drain." Instead foreign contacts, training, and periods of
residency will help promote domestic development. The global poor
32 See David Dollar and Aart Kraay, Growth is Good for the Poor, 7 J Econ Growth 195,
195-96 (2002).
33 For a detailed report on remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, see generally
Roberto Suro, Remittance Senders and Receivers: Tracking the Transnational Channels (Pew His-
panic Center 2003), online at http://pewhispanic.org/fles/reports/23.pdf (visited Jan 22, 2007).
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also benefit from new medicines, new global technologies, and re-
search and development efforts.4
3. Aggregation issues.
The immense long-run benefits of growth help us address aggre-
gation problems, the traditional bugaboo of welfare economics. Pure
Pareto improvements are few and far between. So at some level of the
analysis, through some method or another, we must assert that the
benefits to one group of people outweigh the losses to another. Cost-
benefit analysis invokes a "potential compensation" principle toward
this end. If the winners could in principle compensate the losers, as
measured in material wealth, cost-benefit analysis recommends the
policy, at least subject to distributional caveats. This is not commonly
considered an interpersonal utility comparison, but in practice it func-
tions as one. In most real-world cases, the compensation is never paid
or even seriously contemplated. So we must be judging one set of gains
as socially "worth more" than the losses on the other side of the scale.
I do not reject the potential compensation principle out of hand.
But the principle does not persuade many philosophers or even many
specialists in normative welfare economics. Most generally, if some
people gain and others lose, why should measured total wealth be the
relevant tiebreaker? Must we not consider a broader bundle of plural
values as possible tiebreakers?"
The potential compensation principle nonetheless contains a core
of truth. A policy that brings overwhelming costs but few offsetting
benefits is unlikely to be a good idea. Therefore the potential compen-
sation principle is most plausible when the surplus of benefits far ex-
ceeds the measured costs, or vice versa.
We therein find a means of resurrecting one part of the potential
compensation principle. If the well-being gains to the future are sig-
nificant and ongoing, those gains should far outweigh one-time costs
to the present. Looking toward the future expands the number of
cases where an overwhelming preponderance of benefits lies in the
same direction. As argued above, a sustainable increase in economic
growth will boost many plural values in the medium and long runs. To
be sure, some people will be worse off, and some values, in the short-
to-medium run, will not be favored. In these regards aggregation
34 Consider Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth 84 (Belknap 2004) (not-
ing that "less-developed countries experience substantial gains from [research and development]
expansion in the industrial countries").
35 For the most effective philosophical critique of the potential compensation principle, see
generally Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J Legal Stud 191 (1980).
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problems do not disappear. Nonetheless, the competing options do not
generally offer a deadlock of roughly equivalent values and interests
on each side of the scale. The higher growth alternative will, at some
point in the future, offer a clear and ongoing preponderance of plural
values in its favor. These values will include the distribution of large
benefits to very poor individuals. This predominance of values stands on
one side of the scale whether we consider ordinal or cardinal measures
of welfare, or some weighted average of the two. We should opt for that
preponderance of benefits6
This approach to the aggregation problem coincides with common-
sense morality. Not everyone can be happy all of the time, but we none-
theless should choose an option that makes a strong preponderance of
people much better off. We will never resolve aggregation problems by
producing some new algorithm or voting rule that magically resolves all
conflicts. If John and Sally favor different policy options, there is always
some irreducible clash of interests. We instead should look for options
with a preponderance of values on one side of the scale. We find such
options by considering a broader class of affected individuals, namely
the more distant future. The longer our time horizon, the more likely we
can find a preponderance of values pointing in a particular direction, in
this case toward growth-enhancing policies.
4. Survey evidence on wealth and welfare.
A growing body of literature suggests that additional riches do
not make citizens in wealthy countries any happier, at least not above
a certain level. Using information taken from questionnaires, once a
country has a per capita income of roughly $10,000 a year or more, the
aggregate income-happiness link appears weak. John Helliwell argues
that the curve flattens out at about half of current American per cap-
ita income, or roughly the standard of living in contemporary Greece. 7
These results might lead us to wonder whether economic growth is so
important after all.3
36 See John S. Chipman and James C. Moore, Aggregate Demand, Real National Income,
and the Compensation Principle, 14 Intl Econ Rev 153, 153,155-56 (1973) (presenting the major
technical problems with the potential compensation principle). Note that the grossness of the
real income comparisons, when we consider the distant future, limits the scope for intransitivity
and Scitovsky double-switching problems.
37 See John F. Helliwell, How's Life? Combining Individual and National Variables to Ex-
plain Subjective Well-Being, 20 Econ Modeling 331,355 (2003) ("[T]he well-being effects of living
in higher income countries are small and insignificant, and do not show any evidence of subse-
quent increase once GDP per capita exceeds half that in the United States in the mid 1990s.").
38 See David G. Myers, The Fund% Friends, and Faith of Happy People, 55 Am Psych 56,59
(2000) (stating that among nations with a gross national product above $8,000 the correlation
between wealth and happiness dissipates); Michael Argyle, Causes and Correlates of Happiness,
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Despite this evidence, wealth and happiness commove in the
longer run. At most, the happiness literature shows that many more
changes are irrelevant than we had previously thought. This result
does not eliminate the major benefits of economic growth, as experi-
enced over longer periods of time. It might turn out that (if we believe
the happiness literature) many small changes are irrelevant or nearly
irrelevant for happiness. Yet sufficiently large changes still boost (or
harm) human welfare by significant amounts. If the small changes do
not matter much, that is all the more reason to focus on the large
changes. The importance of significant economic growth for happiness
probably would strengthen if we had a more accurate measure of GDP,
one which also considered, for instance, the value of leisure time.
The standard of living found in contemporary Greece-even if
comparable in happiness to the current U.S.-would not match up to
the likely future with continued growth. Or go back to the past. The
happiness-wealth curve may have had a flat range in the Stone Age,
but the entire range of that curve would not make for a very satisfying
existence today. So a flat range of the curve, at any point in time, does
not break the long-run link between wealth and happiness. Economic
growth still shifts the curve up over time.
in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of
Hedonic Psychology 353, 356 (Russell Sage 1999) (noting that studies have shown only a small
correlation between income and happiness in America); Andrew J. Oswald, Happiness and Eco-
nomic Performance 107 Econ J 1815, 1827 (1997) ("[E]conomic progress buys only a small
amount of extra happiness."). Wealthy countries, when they become wealthier over time, do not
become happier in the aggregate. In some cases (for example, the United States 1946-1991),
greater wealth is correlated with lower levels of self-reported happiness. See David G. Blanch-
flower and Andrew J. Oswald, Well-Being over Time in Britain and the USA 16 (NBER Working
Paper No 7487, Jan 2000), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7487 (visited Jan 22, 2007)
(noting that Americans are not happier although the GDP has risen); Myers, 55 Am Psych at 59
(noting in the 1980s, the Irish had greater life satisfaction than the doubly-wealthy West Ger-
mans); Ed Diener, et al, Positivity and the Construction of Life Satisfaction Judgments: Global
Happiness Is Not the Sum of Its Parts, 1 J Happiness Stud 159, 159-60 (2000) (using Japan in
comparison to Colombia to demonstrate that wealth does not correspond to happiness); Charles
Kenny, Does Growth Cause Happiness or Does Happiness Cause Growth?, 52 Kyklos 3,4 (1999)
(arguing that if there is a correlation between growth and happiness, it is that happiness causes
growth and not vice-versa); Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, Happiness Prospers in Democracy, 1
J Happiness Stud 79, 91 (1999) (finding that happiness does correlate with income but only
minor differences in subjective well-being across income groups); Robert E. Lane, The Joyless
Market Economy, in Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman, eds, Economics, Values, and Organi-
zation 461,462 (Cambridge 1998) (finding support for the proposition that the United States is a
nation of increasingly unhappy people); Richard A. Eastertin, Will Raising the Incomes of All
Increase the Happiness of All?, 27 J Econ Behav & Org 35, 37 (1995) (pointing to evidence that
income growth does not increase happiness). On the United States, see Bruno S. Frey and Alois
Stutzer, Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human Well-Being
76-77 (Princeton 2002) (finding that while income per capita increased, happiness decreased
between 1946 and 1971 in the United States); Ed Diener, Subjective Well-Being, 95 Psych Bull
542,553 (1984) (reporting a downward trend in happiness as wealth grew between 1957 and 1978
in the U.S.).
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It is sometimes questioned whether even extreme catastrophes
make people less happy. Individuals who experience severe disabilities
or physical handicaps do to some extent adjust their expectations. Of-
ten these victims compare themselves to individuals who are even
worse off than they are, or they lower their aspirations in life. The loss
in happiness is not as great as a na've perspective might expect. None-
theless, victims of catastrophe still report lower levels of happiness
than do comparable healthy individuals. The happiness difference is
more distinct the greater the extent of the disability. At the very least,
a significant percentage of victims experience an ongoing "core of
distress" for many years. People cope least successfully when the ca-
tastrophe or malady is ongoing and involves an ongoing deterioration
of condition. Most of the counterintuitive results come when the bad
event has a "once and for all" nature, such as a one-time physical
handicap. But individuals remain subjectively worse off when they
suffer from progressive or degenerative problems."
The observed flatlining of the happiness-wealth relationship also
may in part reflect framing. The literature usually focuses on aspira-
tion or treadmill effects. Under this view, you get more but you start
expecting more as well, or aspiring to more. The greater wealth there-
fore translates into less happiness than might have been expected. But
this is not the only adjustment occasioned by growing wealth. The
wealthy also recalibrate how they should respond to questions about
their happiness. If happiness itself is subject to framing effects, surely
talk about happiness is subject to framing effects as well. The wealthy
39 On coping, see generally Camille B. Wortman and Roxane C. Silver, Coping with Irrevo-
cable Loss, in Gary R. Vandenbos and Brenda K. Bryant, ed, Cataclysms, Crises, and Catastro-
phes: Psychology in Action 185 (1987); C. Buf Meyer and Shelley E. Taylor, Adjustment to Rape,
50 J Personality & Soc Psych 1226 (1986); Ronald C. Kessler, Richard H. Price, and Camille B.
Wortman, Social Factors in Psychopathology: Stress; Social Support, and Coping Processes, 36
Ann Rev Psych 531 (1985) (examining the interaction between stress, psychiatric impairments,
and coping mechanisms); Phillip Brickman, Dan Coates, and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery
Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J Personality & Soc Psych 1917 (1978);
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Camille B. Wortman, Attributions of Blame and Coping in the "Real
World": Severe Accident Victims React to Their Lot, 35 J Personality & Soc Psych 351 (1977). On
the "core of distress" idea, see Frey and Stutzer, Happiness and Economics at 56 (cited in note
38) (noting that paraplegics cope effectively but are still not as happy as an accident-free indi-
vidual); Margaret S. Stroebe, Robert 0. Hansson, and Wolfgang Stroebe, Contemporary Themes
and Controversies in Bereavement Research, in Margaret S. Stroebe, Wolfgang Stroebe, and
Robert 0. Hansson, eds, Handbook of Bereavement: Theory, Research, and Intervention 457,465-
67 (Cambridge 1993) (discussing the tendency of grief to last one to two years and sometimes
even longer in certain individuals); Philip W. Wirtz and Adele V Harrell, Police and Victims of
Physical Assault, 14 Crim Just & Behav 81, 86 (1987) (finding victims of physical assault experi-
ence increased fear, stress, and anxiety). On degeneration, see Shane Frederick and George
Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in Kahneman, Diener, and Schwarz, eds, Well-Being 302,312
(cited in note 38) (noting that individuals do not adapt as well to disability when the disability is
chronic or progressive).
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develop higher standards for reporting when they are "happy" or
"very happy." If you are a millionaire living next door to a billionaire,
you might be less likely to report that you are ecstatically well off. This
does not mean that you spend your entire time envying the billionaire
or suffering because of your lower relative status.
So let us assume that both framing effects-concerning happiness
and talk about happiness -operate at the same time. This will suggest
that even a constant measured level of reported happiness implies
growing real happiness over time. Life improvements do usually make
us happier, while both our expectations and our reporting standards
adjust upwards. This is the most likely interpretation of the aggregate
data. Furthermore, it is supported by direct observation. Most individu-
als strive to earn higher incomes even after they have experienced the
strength of "aspiration" and "treadmill" effects. Note also that within a
country wealthier people report higher levels of happiness, on average,
than do poorer people."° This result has not been challenged, and it is
unlikely that it all boils down to a zero-sum relative status effect.
Finally, even if we accept the "flatline" empirical result as valid,
the questions are posed to individuals in normal life circumstances.
The answers will not pick up the ability of wealthier economies to
postpone or mitigate extreme tragedies, whether in the wealthier or
poorer parts of our world. For instance, the happiness measures, by
their nature, do not pick up the benefits of greater life expectancy. The
dead and incapacitated cannot complain about their situation, at least
not in questionnaire form. If an immigrant, or a child of an immigrant,
fills out the form, there is no comparison with a preimmigration state of
affairs. By its very nature, happiness research draws upon a fixed pool of
people in relatively normal circumstances. This will limit its ability to
measure some of the largest benefits brought by economic growth.
Opting for growth also addresses intra-self aggregation problems.
For instance, individual preferences do not always reflect individual
interests. Observed preferences often appear to be irrational, transi-
tive, spiteful, or otherwise morally dubious. Given these facts, it is of-
ten asked why the concept of preference satisfaction should stand at
the center of an economic approach to welfare. Arguably, satisfying
particular preferences, at the margin, does not always make people
happier or make the world a better place.
Focusing on the macroeconomics of long-term growth sidesteps
these dilemmas. We might doubt that the marginal fast food cheese-
burger is worth $4.89 for me, all things considered. Perhaps the offer is
manipulating my evolutionarily-programmed desire for more fat, to
40 Diener, 95 Psych Bull at 553 (cited in note 38).
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the detriment of my health. It is more difficult to doubt that living in a
much wealthier society is good for me, all things considered. The rele-
vant comparisons become quite gross after the passage of enough
time. A given individual is likely better off living an extra twenty years,
receiving anesthesia at the dentist, enjoying plentiful foodstuffs, hav-
ing more years of education, and not losing any children to premature
illness. Similarly, people one hundred years from now will be much
better off if growth stays high. At some point, these cumulated bene-
fits will be sufficiently gross and sufficiently obvious to be robust to
particular instances of irrational or misguided preferences.
5. Growth maximization versus cost-benefit analysis.
The importance of the growth rate is hardly news, but rarely is
the point made fully explicit for the theory of economic policy. Instead
of performing a cost-benefit analysis, I recommend that we simply ask
whether a given policy is likely to increase or decrease the rate of eco-
nomic growth. Over a sufficiently long time horizon, the growth ef-
fects of policies will overwhelm the static allocation effects as meas-
ured by cost-benefit analysis. Of course, the postulate of Deep Con-
cern for the Distant Future is central to this judgment and central to
our ability to overcome aggregation problems.
Under the traditional cost-benefit view, we should not in general
maximize the rate of economic growth. At the growth maximum there
will always exist some increase in current consumption that will lower
growth yet improve current welfare. In this view, future periods will be
wealthier, and thus maximizing the utility path of growth will imply
pulling some additional resources toward the present. Marginal utilities
are equalized over time, taking into account a declining marginal utility
of wealth. The recommended rate of growth will stand below the maxi-
mum possible rate of growth due to growing wealth over time (see
Equation (1) above). My more future-oriented perspective emphasizes
that the more rapidly growing economy will, after some point, have
systematically higher levels of both wealth and well-being. The differ-
ence in welfare would be analogous to putting several or more genera-
tions of the modern world back into nineteenth-century conditions.
If the time horizon is extremely short, the benefits of continued
higher growth will be choked off and will tend to be small in nature.
Even if we hold a deep concern for the distant future, perhaps there is
no distant future to care about. To present this point in its starkest
form, imagine that the world were set to end tomorrow. There would
be little point in maximizing the growth rate, and arguably we should
just throw a party and consume what we can. Even if we could boost
growth in the interim hours, the payoff would be small and not very
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durable. The case for growth maximization therefore is stronger the
longer the time horizon we consider.
One generalizing approach might classify policies in terms of the
size and time distribution of their benefits. Policies with small and
temporary benefits would call for a relative balance closer toward
cost-benefit analysis. Other policies-with larger benefits and more
durable effects on long-term growth-would give greater weight to
inframarginal methods. Marginal and inframarginal approaches would
coexist in a common framework. In practical terms, we know that pol-
icy analysis should involve greater emphasis on growth maximization
than is suggested by current methods of cost-benefit analysis.
6. Once-and-for-all changes versus growth rate changes.
Beneficial policies may fall into one of three categories. First, they
may increase some benefit in once-and-for-all fashion. Imagine boost-
ing the power of all extant light bulbs for one year. Second, they may
yield a benefit for the ongoing future. Imagine discovering a light bulb
that burns longer. Third, they may lead to a permanent increase in the
rate of economic growth. Imagine a new laboratory that speeds the
rate at which better light bulbs are discovered.
Gains of the first kind, which do not stretch far into the future,
become in relative terms much less important than gains of the other
two kinds (the same can be said for costs). Gains of the third kind are
now more important, in relative terms, than gains of the second kind.
The temporally distant, exponentially increasing gains are no longer
discounted away at such a high rate.
Which categories best describe the costs and benefits of policy
options becomes a question of social importance. A given cost might
involve an up-front, once-and-for-all burden, or instead it might bring
a systematic decline in the growth rate over time.
Counterintuitively, a concern for the distant future sometimes
will militate against some environmental investments. For instance,
many of the costs of global warming appear to be "one time" in na-
ture, such as the costs of relocating coastal and inland settlements. In
long-run equilibrium, transition costs aside, it is no worse and arguably
better for the world to have a warmer climate (we spend more money
on warming space than on cooling it). At the same time, stopping or
limiting global warming might lower permanently the rate of eco-
nomic growth. When the rate of intergenerational discount is suffi-
ciently low, maximizing the growth rate tends to take priority over
avoiding one-time expenditures and one-time adjustments. Even if
those one-time expenditures are large, we will earn back that value
over time and more, due to the logic of investment compounding.
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Alternatively, other environmental issues will become more im-
portant. For instance, many scientists have argued that global warming
will increase the number of virulent and persistent storms. This can
limit the prospects for economic growth (this is illustrative; I am not
seeking to debate the facts). When it comes to global warming, we
should be more concerned with the growth-affecting elements of the
phenomenon, and less concerned with the one-off effects.
Economic models provide differing accounts of which changes
are likely to affect the growth rate. The most prominent approach, the
Solow model, postulates a stripped-down, economy-wide production
function based on constant returns to scale. Output is the result of
capital inputs, labor inputs, and technological progress, which renders
both capital and labor more effective." In this model, the primary way
to increase growth is to induce a higher rate of technological innovation.
Along these lines, many empirical tests have shown embodied techno-
logical progress to be the major force behind U.S. economic growth.
In the Solow model, the rate of return on capital diminishes as
the capital stock increases, and the rate of capital accumulation re-
sponds to this rate of return. Given these assumptions, poorer coun-
tries should be expected to catch up to richer countries as they borrow
new technologies and increase their capital stocks. Furthermore, econo-
mies should be able to recover quickly from one-time shocks, such as
earthquakes. Although the capital stock has fallen, the rate of return on
capital is now higher. Additional savings should make up the gap and
restore the economy to its previous growth path.
The Solow model makes a distinction between the level of real
income and subsequent rates of growth. Many traditional factors-
such as a boost in savings and investment -are seen as contributing to
"transition growth paths" but not to "steady state growth" in long-run
equilibrium. Alternatively, a decrease in wealth lowers the base on
which growth occurs, but it has no necessary implications for the suc-
ceeding rate of growth in the long run.
To use a biological metaphor, consider a lobster. If an arm is
lopped off another arm grows rapidly to replace it. In the long run the
lobster is not much worse off, even if it never quite replaces its origi-
nal weight. In economic terms the mechanism runs as follows. The de-
cline in the capital stock raises the rate of return on capital, which in-
duces more savings, which tends to restore a higher capital stock. In
the long run, an increase in the savings rate makes up, over time, for
the "destroyed" resources. The very rapid recovery of some economies
41 See Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q J Econ
65,73 (1956). See also David Romer, Advanced Macroeconomics 5-33 (McGraw-Hill 1996).
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after wars or major natural disasters might represent this mechanism in
operation. The rate of growth will remain permanently lower only if the
negative shock somehow reduces the rate of technological progress.
And since capital has a diminishing marginal product in the model, a
higher rate of savings will boost the absolute level of income and transi-
tional growth, but not the ongoing rate of growth. Growth would pro-
ceed from a higher base but not at higher rates in the long run.2
The Solow model implies that policy toward science and innova-
tion is especially important. At the same time, we should be less wor-
ried about a variety of daily catastrophes.
In contrast to the Solow model, increasing-returns models suggest
that more resources beget more growth. In this view, larger economies
should grow more rapidly than smaller economies, and growth pat-
terns should be serially correlated over time. Ideas -and their nonri-
val nature-often are cited as the fundamental source of increasing
returns. Once an idea has been generated, it can be used many times
by many different people at very low marginal cost. Larger markets
generate stronger incentives for idea production and thus face a com-
parative growth advantage. New ideas will lead to more growth, which
43in turns encourages more new ideas, and so on.
Increasing-returns models are sometimes traced back to Adam
Smith. In Smith's implicit model, a larger market size supports a greater
division of labor, which in turn makes the economy more productive. In
other models, greater openness to trade, or a common market area, can
drive an increasing returns to scale process. Along these lines, legal and
42 That being said, some later modifications of the Solow model allow for the rates of
savings and investment to be correlated with economic growth in a more general manner. See,
for example, Jonathon Temple, The New Growth Evidence, 37 J Econ Lit 112, 137-41 (1999) (dis-
cussing the role that investment in physical capital, human capital, and research and development
play in economic growth). Extensions by Hirofumi Uzawa and Robert Lucas stress the role of
human capital-not just physical capital-in boosting or imintaining the growth rate. See Hiro-
fumi Uzawa, Optimum Technical Change in an Aggregative Model of Economic Growth, 6 Intl
Econ Rev 18, 19 (1965) (examining human capital in detail)- Lucas, 22 J Monetary Econ at 17-27
(cited in note 30) (considering a model of growth that focuses on human capital). In some eco-
nomic models, having more capital does not always increase the growth rate. In some so-called
Golden Rule models the costs of maintaining extra capital can exceed its rate of return; in these
cases, the proper recommendation is to decrease the rate of investment. See, for example, Miguel
Sidrauski, Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Monetary Economy, 57 Am Econ Rev
534, 544 (1967). It is not generally believed that these latter models are policy-relevant.
43 On increasing-returns models, see Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technical Change, 98 J
Polit Econ 71, 71-73 (1990) (finding "[liarger markets induce more research and faster growth"
in turn creating even larger markets and so on); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-
Run Growth, 94 J Polit Econ 1002,1002-04 (1986) ("[Pjer capita output can grow without bound,
possibly at a rate that is monotonically increasing over time."). On the Solow model versus the
increasing-returns model, see Symposium, New Growth Theory, 8 J Econ Persp 23-72 (1994).
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regulatory standardization may help economies grow, as has been one
rationale for the European Union.
A one-time negative shock more likely has serious negative ef-
fects on the long-run rate of growth. Intuitively, the increasing-returns
concept suggests that resources multiply themselves at increasingly
rapid rates. The larger the economy, the faster it will grow. Rather than
losing the arm of a lobster, we have lost a colony of very fertile rabbits.
Even if the colony is small at first, it has the potential to become much
larger with time. The increasing-returns model implies that "one-time"
negative shocks in fact have significant lasting effects.
The Solow model suggests a picture of greater resilience. In gen-
eral, the Solow model will give us greater latitude to worry about the
present, whereas the increasing-returns model imposes a stricter disci-
pline. Many more events will matter greatly for the distant future. To
the extent the increasing-returns model is true, it is harder to justify
the pursuit of non-growth-related values. The Solow model suggests a
lower final cost for indulging in present values. When debating one-
time costs, it is therefore a central question whether the Solow model,
the increasing-returns model, or some other approach comes closest
to capturing the real world.
That being said, the logic of the increasing-returns model will
likely carry considerable weight in our final evaluation. In many cases
our best answer, given current knowledge, will suggest that a given
cost brings some probability of an ongoing growth effect and some
probability of a once-and-for-all adjustment cost. In our expected-
value calculations, this will operate as an expected impact on the long-
term rate of economic growth, of course discounted for the uncer-
tainty. The long-run logic of the increasing-returns model applies, even
when that model is not our best current forecast of what drives eco-
nomic growth."
44 Neoinstitutional approaches are less formal than either the Solow or increasing-returns
models. They point to the importance of property rights, well-functioning institutions, trust, the
rule of law, and properly aligned microeconomic incentives. Nonetheless, these views do not
typically specify which policy changes cause permanent boosts in the growth rate, as opposed to
once-and-for-all changes. For a foundational work on neoinstitutionalist approaches, see gener-
ally Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton 1981). See also gen-
erally Robert H. Bates, et al, Analytic Narratives (Princeton 1998) (presenting a number of essays
in the neoinstitutionalist tradition); Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic
Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (Yale 1982) (applying the neoinstitutionalist approach
to the rise and collapse of civilizations); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson,
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth 11-20 (NBER Working Paper No
10481, May 2004), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10481 (visited Jan 22, 2007) (surveying
neoinstitutionalist literature).
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B. How Much Should We Redistribute?
Increasing-returns growth models will make us more wary about
redistribution than will the Solow growth model. In the Solow growth
model, many of the economic costs from redistribution are "once-and-
for-all," rather than lowering the long-term rate of growth. Under the
increasing-returns model, any deadweight loss makes the economy
smaller and thus limits future rates of growth with significant implica-
tions for the distant future.
This is one way in which traditional political debates should be
redrawn. Individuals who believe in increasing-returns models should
be much more skeptical of welfare states than individuals who believe
in the Solow model.
More generally, we should redistribute only up to the point that
maximizes the rate of sustainable economic growth. This may mean
more redistribution than we currently undertake, or perhaps redistri-
bution of a much different kind, namely growth-enhancing redistribu-
tion. (It is debatable how much today's government programs in fact
redistribute to the poor at all.) It will not, however, suggest that a utili-
tarian or consequentialist approach is obliged to redistribute most of
national income to the very poor.
To cite some pluses from redistribution, a welfare state can give
the poor greater access to education and nutrition. These individuals
not only enjoy a higher quality of life, but they produce goods and
services, they contribute to tax revenues, and they are less likely to
end up as a destructive social force.5 Other growth-enhancing benefits
of redistribution are political in nature. Welfare payments sometimes
"buy" the loyalties of special interest groups, thereby inducing them to
support public order. Some of the poor will be less desperate and will
feel less desperate as well. Those groups receive a financial stake in
the system and socially sanctioned legitimacy for their claims. More
generally, welfare systems make many higher-income individuals feel
good about their state and increase levels of political support. Many
people want to have states whose benevolence they can feel good
about. This benevolence contributes to state legitimacy and thus to
public order.46
45 See, for example, Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik, Distributive Politics and Economic
Growth, 109 Q J Econ 465,477-78,484-85 (1994) (arguing that high inequality leads to a fiercer
dispute over the distribution of resources, increases conflict, and leads to lower growth rates).
46 See, for example, Dennis Epple and Thomas Romer, Mobility and Redistribution, in
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds, 2 Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Politics 313, 314 (MIT
1994) (noting studies that posit the wealthy's concern for the poor as one factor contributing to a
redistributive welfare state). For a survey of the growing literature on how income distribution
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These arguments provide good reasons to support some degree of
transfers. Furthermore, they suggest an appropriate nature and scope
for redistribution, namely that we target growth-enhancing programs.
Beyond some point, a sufficiently generous welfare state limits
the rate of growth. It withdraws some individuals from the labor force,
weakens productive incentives, necessitates higher tax rates, and is
usually combined with static, insider-oriented labor market regula-
tions. Furthermore, if everyone approaches government looking for a
handout, basic mechanisms of governance can break down, leading to
rentseeking, corruption, and fiscal bloat. Alternatively, welfare may
create urban cultures of dependency and crime, which endanger social
order. As noted above, the empirical literature suggests that non-
infrastructure government spending is correlated positively with lower
growth rates. Over the long run, this will hurt the prospects of poor
people around the world. 7
More subtly, high levels of welfare make it harder for wealthy
countries to afford large numbers of poor immigrants from around the
world. The more we spend on domestic welfare, the less we can spend
on absorbing immigrants. In public choice terms, a larger welfare state
will make society less willing to take in many immigrants. Our true
concern is global growth, rather than the per capita average in any
single country, and value-maximizing immigration boosts this variable
significantly. So even if a specified set of welfare expenditures brings
some growth benefits, alternative investments may be superior.
We therefore can see limits to the common utilitarian or conse-
quentialist prescription to redistribute a massive share of global wealth.
It is true that sending a large chunk of American GDP to Africa would
raise African welfare in the short run. But if current total income were
divided equally, world per capita income would be about $3500. This
average would then fall rapidly, due to incentive effects; after all, peo-
ple would work much less hard if they expected their surplus wealth
to be confiscated. Civilization as we know it could not survive, and the
world's poor would fall into a deeper state of misery. The poor coun-
can affect growth, see Alfred Greiner, Willi Semmler, and Gang Gong, The Forces of Economic
Growth 132-36 (Princeton 2005).
47 See, for example, Robert J. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106
Q J Econ 407, 430 (1991) (stating that larger government consumption has a negative effect on
growth and investment). See also Robert E. Goodin, et al, The Real Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
151 (Cambridge 1999) (finding welfare regimes bring about growth and prosperity at about the
same rate as corporatist and social democratic regimes); Peter H. Lindert, Growing Public: Social
Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century 239 (Cambridge 2004) (arguing
that higher welfare spending tends to be packaged with other growth-enhancing policies, such as
low taxation on capital income). However, Lindert does not show that higher spending at West-
ern European levels is itself good for economic growth. Id.
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tries no longer would benefit from their interactions with the previously
richer countries. So, rather than redistributing most wealth, we would
reap greater utilitarian benefits by investing it in high-return activities. 4
A sufficiently long time horizon will favor growth over redistribu-
tion even if we are counting only the interests of the very poor in the
social welfare function. The benefits of radical redistribution are one-
time in nature. We can try to equalize all wealth today, but we would
not be able to draw on comparable resources for the next generation.
Such a widespread collective redistribution would lead rapidly to
negative economic growth. In contrast, the benefits of economic
growth will compound over time. It is common to scorn the phrase
"trickle down economics," but a steady and ongoing flow of benefits is
exactly the goal. A flood is better than a trickle, but a lasting trickle is
better than eating our cake today and cashing in all of our chips.
C. Utilitarian Slaves?
Peter Singer and Shelly Kagan have argued that our personal ob-
ligations toward the poor are strong. 9 Bernard Williams, among others,
claimed that these obligations are so demanding that they provide a
reason to reject utilitarian reasoning."° The needs of the suffering are
so enormous that few able or wealthy individuals would be able to
carry out individual life projects. We can imagine, for instance, that
every individual is obliged to work for charity, or to send most of his
or her income to the poor in India. Wealthy doctors should spend their
careers in African villages. Many more of us would have to become
doctors or nurses. A mother might have to abandon or sell her baby to
send food to the babies of others, and so on.
At the individual level, we may well be obliged to help the poor
more than we are doing. But utilitarian considerations do not imply
48 On utilitarian obligations, see Geoffrey Scarre, Utilitarianism 182-204 (Routledge 1996).
See also JJ.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against 77-150 (Cambridge
1973) (offering a critique of utilitarianism). For other critiques of extreme utilitarianism, see Tho-
mas Nagel, The View from Nowhere 190-96,205 (Oxford 1986) (rejecting utilitarianism as a form of
impersonal morality that forces individuals to act against their interests); Peter Railton, Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 Phil & Pub Aft 134,156-60 (1984); Susan Wolf,
Moral Saints, 79 J Phil 419, 427-30 (1982) (critiquing utilitarianism because it forces moral perfec-
tion, an undesirable outcome because someone can be "too good"); Israel Scheffler, Science and
Subjectivity 68 (Hackett 2d ed 1982) (characterizing utilitarian experimental inquiries as not means
to "proof or discovery"); Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal 20 (Signet 1967) (noting an
attempt to sum the "good" of all individuals is meaningless and indeterminate).
49 Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality 395 (Oxford 1991) (noting that promotion of the
good requires meeting the needs of the poor); Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 168-71 (Cambridge
1979) (arguing there is an obligation to assist the poor).
50 Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism at 108 (cited in note 48) (questioning how far one
must go to determine if an action is "maximally beneficent").
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personal enslavement or massive redistribution of our personal wealth.
Most of us should work hard, be creative, be loyal to our civilization,
build healthy institutions, save for the future, contribute to an atmos-
phere of social trust, be critical when necessary, and love our families.
The personal obligation is to contribute to sustainable economic growth
rather than to engage in massive charitable redistribution.
These stipulated individual obligations are not so far from com-
monsense morality. To be sure, we have not bridged the gap between
utilitarian reasoning and commonsense morality. Even when utilitari-
anism and common sense recommend the same courses of behavior,
they do so for very different reasons. Utilitarianism tells us we should
work and save to serve the purposes of others, or, in this case, future
generations. Commonsense morality tells us that we should work and
save to take care of our families and because we own our lives. These
two perspectives remain different. Nonetheless, to the extent the prac-
tical conclusions converge, we can think of utilitarian and common-
sense modes of reasoning as two parts of some broader pluralist moral
picture. Rather than forcing those two perspectives into complete ac-
cord, it may suffice that two of the "kits in our toolbox" point in
broadly compatible directions. We do not yet have the Best Ethical
Theory, but our quest is no longer so torn between two warring ac-
counts of what we should do. By emphasizing our deep concern for
the distant future, we come closer to reconciling utilitarianism (or con-
sequentialism) and commonsense morality.
Commonsense morality also suggests that public and private
codes should differ in their advice. For instance, a mother might be
justified in giving preference to her own baby, rather than tending to
the babies of others. At the same time, perhaps the government should
behave as some approximation of an impersonal welfare-maximizer,
taking into account the interests of all citizens." When allocating re-
sources, governments should not favor one particular baby over an-
other. It has remained an open question why morality should be split
in this fashion. After all, why do moral obligations change, simply be-
cause an individual is labeled as acting privately rather than within the
context of a public institution? But we now have the tools to defend a
bifurcation of this kind. Such a division of responsibilities stands a
good chance of maximizing the long-term rate of sustainable eco-
nomic growth. Proscribed behavior of both private citizens and gov-
ernment then would spring from a common principle of growth maxi-
51 See Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy 61 (Cambridge 1995) (dif-
ferentiating between private and public utilitarianism and advocating that the government act in
a utilitarian manner).
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mization, and the resulting principles again would be roughly com-
patible with commonsense morality.
Empirical research suggests that a stable market order, private
property, and the rule of law are strongly correlated with economic
growth. Infrastructure-oriented government spending and years of
education are positively correlated with growth as well. Noninfrastruc-
ture government spending, high and volatile inflation, and regulatory
interventions all are negatively correlated with growth. A good distri-
bution of income may benefit growth. For lesser-developed nations,
colonial origins and the quality of current legal institutions help predict
growth. A quick summary of these results suggests a leading role for
capitalistic market institutions, as have driven the growth of the West
and parts of Asia. Governments should focus on providing growth-
maximizing public goods."
That being said, we can imagine circumstances under which a utili-
tarian should favor large-scale redistribution toward the very poor. Per-
haps, for whatever reason, the world is ending in the near future. Redis-
tribution then would stand a greater chance of being favored in utili-
tarian terms. The scope for compounding over time would be corre-
spondingly limited and the immediate returns to charity would weigh
more heavily in the decision calculus. Alternatively, the real return on
investment might be permanently negative or zero. In this case, com-
pounding would not operate, and we again would see greater reason
to redistribute wealth.
Under more normal circumstances, a utilitarian or consequential-
ist framework still may recommend that some individuals sacrifice
significant parts of their lives, or risk such sacrifices, for a greater so-
cial good. Martin Luther King, Jr. brought much good to the world,
with respect to both justice and economic growth. Nonetheless, such
obligations to sacrifice cannot be universal or near universal. If we all
went around sacrificing, there would be no civilization left to advance.
52 For seminal investigations, see Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic
Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J Legal Stud 503, 523 (2001) (noting that "the common law
produces improvements in property rights and contract enforcement that in turn speed eco-
nomic growth"); William Easterly and Sergio Rebelo, Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: An
Empirical Investigation, 32 J Monetary Econ 417,419,442 (1993) (finding a correlation between
growth and public investment in transport and governmental budget surplus); Barro, 106 Q J
Econ at 437 (cited in note 47) (summarizing research findings on the correlates of growth);
Kevin B. Grier and Gordon Tullock, An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic Growth,
1951-80, 24 J Monetary Econ 259, 274 (1989) (finding significant negative correlations between
economic growth and governmental share in GDP and between economic growth and inflation
variability). For a survey of time-series tests of similar growth propositions, see Greiner,
Semmler, and Gong, The Forces of Economic Growth at 159-63 (cited in note 46) (summarizing
time-series tests that consider the correlation between growth, on the one hand, and investment,
education, knowledge accumulation, public infrastructure, and income inequality, on the other).
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As we saw before, we should reject collective sacrificial recommenda-
tions that will lower the rate of sustainable economic growth.53
In some cases, utilitarian prescriptions will have morally counter-
intuitive implications, but running counter to the usual fears of en-
slaved doctors serving Africa. Namely, utilitarianism may support the
transfer of resources from the poor to the rich. A talented entrepre-
neur, for instance, can probably earn a higher rate of return on in-
vested resources than can a disabled great-grandmother. So we will
have some reason, when thinking about the future, to redistribute ad-
ditional resources to the more productive members of society. The
implications will be antiegalitarian at first, but over a sufficiently long
time horizon the poor will benefit increasingly from the high rate of
economic growth. The results need not be antiegalitarian if we take
the appropriate broader stretch of time, but they still will appear anti-
egalitarian by the usual metrics.
I am not suggesting that a good pluralist theory will, all things
considered, endorse systematic redistribution toward the wealthy or
the talented. This may be one case where we impose a rights con-
straint on the recommendation of growth maximization. Nonetheless,
the example shows how direct, short-term redistribution is no longer
the default option for an impersonal moral theory that emphasizes
individual well-being. Pure utilitarianism can be antiegalitarian, at
least in the short run, and even in the medium run, in its implications.
D. Inframarginal Considerations
To return to where we started, a look at the poor suggests further
reasons why the economic approach to discounting is incomplete.
Cost-benefit analysis cannot escape the necessity of considering hu-
man well-being in some fashion. Some number of the poor will always
be with us, and we must ask how to weight the costs and benefits that
accrue to them.
The economic case for a positive rate assumes that wealth is ris-
ing, but this is not always the relevant assumption. For instance, the
world as a whole is richer today than ever before. Nonetheless, the
extent of growth spillover benefits to large numbers of the very poor
is also higher than ever before. The more distant future might boost
these spillovers yet further; this would mean that not all future benefi-
53 Often our obligations are collective rather than individual. In a game-theoretic setting,
perhaps not everyone need sacrifice, but it is an open question which person should sacrifice. In
this case, the correct recommendation is for stronger sacrifice-inducing norms, which again ac-
cords with commonsense morality.
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ciaries have high levels of wealth and correspondingly low marginal
utilities of money.
We can imagine further relevant scenarios where the rising
wealth assumption is misleading. When we evaluate the danger of fu-
ture civilizational collapse, it is an open question whether rates of re-
turn will remain positive. We are asking how bad an outcome it would
be if rates of return turned consistently zero or negative. That is part
of what civilizational collapse means. We cannot answer this question
by assuming that rates of return remain positive and that the marginal
utility of money is falling over time. We must instead make rough inter-
personal welfare comparisons concerning current lives and future lives.-
Pending individual deaths present more commonplace cases for
which falling real wealth makes the need for interpersonal compari-
sons obvious. As a person approaches death, he or she in real terms
becomes very poor, regardless of measured nominal wealth. Suicides
aside, the forthcoming loss of human capital (in other words, life) usu-
ally far exceeds the expected pleasure from leaving a bequest. So
when we compare present versus future deaths, the economic frame-
work again does not yield a simple case for positive discounting. We
are comparing one very poor about-to-die person to another very
poor about-to-die person. Such comparisons will always be with us, no
matter how wealthy society grows. In other words, to the extent that
wealth prolongs lives, it is always conferring large benefits to large
numbers of "the very poor," if we understand that concept to include
human capital as well.
These points all restate the well-known distinction between mar-
ginal and inframarginal changes in welfare. Traditional cost-benefit
analysis does best when the possible change in allocations is small
relative to the wealth of the individuals in question and the marginal
utility of money for each person is roughly constant across the possi-
ble policy changes. In those cases, market prices (with appropriate
adjustments for risk, taxes, and transaction costs) will measure the
value of resources. If apples cost twenty-five cents apiece, we know
that an additional apple is close in value to that same twenty-five
cents; the same is true for having one apple less. But when wealth ef-
fects are large for the individuals involved, the marginal utilities of
money change, and market prices and interest rates no longer measure
54 Christian Gollier, Discounting an Uncertain Future, 85 J Pub Econ 149, 163 (2002), ar-
gues that the discount rate should be zero for some point in the distant future, provided that the
rate of growth in each period is uncertain. Uncertain growth (read: some chance of eventual
catastrophe) brings some chance that the marginal utility of money for a future period is ex-
tremely high, high enough to justify zero discounting.
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marginal rates of substitution for the relevant outcomes. Tragedies-
the major bane of human existence -are inframarginal by their nature."
A simple example can clarify the limitations of the marginal ap-
proach to welfare economics. A desert country probably has a higher
marginal value of water than does a country with many lakes. Market
prices will reflect this difference in value, as water will cost more in
the drier country. But this does not give us useful information about
how to forecast the relative values of "the desert country loses all its
water" against "the lake country loses all its water." Either country
would fall apart without water, but the current market prices of water
do not tell us which collapse would be a greater tragedy. The original
difference in marginal values for water does not even "imperfectly
measure" or "forecast" the differing value of the two societies. The
small change and the large change are simply two different magnitudes.
Or compare two lives. Tom is in the desert and Jane is in the wet
state of Wisconsin. Tom has a higher marginal value for water. But
which is a greater loss: Tom losing all access to water forever and dy-
ing, or Jane losing all access to water forever? Tom's higher marginal
valuation does not predict which life is more important. Again, we
cannot readily infer inframarginal values from marginal values. In fact
under some cardinal views, the loss of Jane's life will be the greater
tragedy. Jane lives in a wealthier, water-rich world and therefore has a
higher standard of living than does Tom. If we are willing to make in-
terpersonal welfare comparisons in this setting, it might be worse if
Jane died.
Marginal values do provide good clues to inframarginal values in
many cases. Assume, for instance, that Betty has a marginal valuation
of high heels of $60 and Tyler has a marginal valuation of zero. Tyler
doesn't value high heels at all. It is then a greater loss for Betty (rather
than Tyler) to have no high heels. When strong heterogeneity of pref-
erence is present, marginal valuations can give clues as to inframar-
ginal valuations. But in many policy choices strong heterogeneity does
55 See generally Jean Drize and Nicholas Stem, The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in
Alan J. Auerbach and Martin S. Feldstein, eds, 2 Handbook of Public Economics 909 (Elsevier
1987) (surveying the difference between marginal and inframarginal effects in the theory of cost-
benefit analysis). On this theme, see also John P. Hoehn and Alan Randall, Too Many Proposals
Pass the Benefit Cost Test, 79 Am Econ Rev 544, 550 (1989) (suggesting that conventional cost-
benefit approaches to evaluating policy "systematically overstate net benefits"); David E. Wil-
dasin, Indirect Distributional Effects in Benefit-Cost Analysis of Small Projects, 98 Econ J 801,
804,805 (1988) ("[Slmall equilibrium price-changes that emanate from small public projects are
not necessarily negligible for the purposes of project evaluation."); John S. Chipman and James
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not hold. The relevant policies involve loss of life, senility, loss of
health, and other universal human tragedies. Virtually everyone
wishes to avoid these outcomes, just as virtually everyone values
drinkable water. We then face no clear link between marginal and
inframarginal values.
So when we are talking about policy effects over long periods of
time, the marginal approach often fails. The marginal approach holds
for policies whose long-term effects dampen out into a small squib.
But other policies, such as an increase in the rate of economic growth,
will have significant effects into the distant future. People fifty or one
hundred years from now will be much wealthier than otherwise, and we
must make some inframarginal comparisons, which brings us back to in-
terpersonal utility comparisons and a deep concern for the distant future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let us sum up some core conclusions:
1. Our deep concern for the distant future has concrete policy implications.
2. Welfare economics should focus on empirical questions of growth
and place less emphasis on traditional cost-benefit analysis.
3. Normative argumentation should focus much more on which pol-
icy changes involve once-and-for-all changes in wealth, and which
have a long-term impact on the rate of growth.
4. The proper role of government is to support growth-enhancing
public goods.
5. We should care most about those environmental problems that
will impact the long-run rate of true GDP growth. One-time losses
and adjustment costs are less important than we used to think.
6. Even if we are strict utilitarians, our collective obligations to the
very poor are more limited than is commonly believed. Given a
sufficiently long time horizon, economic growth is the best means
of improving the lot of the poor. Our strongest obligation is to
adopt growth-maximizing institutions.
7. These views do not stand in gross conflict with the conclusions of
commonsense morality.
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